Causal cognition, force dynamics and early hunting technologies by Gärdenfors, Peter & Lombard, Marlize
fpsyg-09-00087 February 8, 2018 Time: 16:44 # 1
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 12 February 2018
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00087
Edited by:
Árpád Csathó,
University of Pécs Medical School,
Hungary
Reviewed by:
Katja Mellmann,
University of Göttingen, Germany
Matt Joseph Rossano,
Southeastern Louisiana University,
United States
*Correspondence:
Peter Gärdenfors
peter.gardenfors@lucs.lu.se
†These authors have contributed
equally to this work.
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Evolutionary Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 31 October 2017
Accepted: 19 January 2018
Published: 12 February 2018
Citation:
Gärdenfors P and Lombard M (2018)
Causal Cognition, Force Dynamics
and Early Hunting Technologies.
Front. Psychol. 9:87.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00087
Causal Cognition, Force Dynamics
and Early Hunting Technologies
Peter Gärdenfors1,2*† and Marlize Lombard2,3†
1 Cognitive Science, Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Lund, Sweden, 2 Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study,
Wallenberg Research Centre, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa, 3 Centre for Anthropological Research,
Department of Anthropology and Development Studies, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
With this contribution we analyze ancient hunting technologies as one way to explore
the development of causal cognition in the hominin lineage. Building on earlier work, we
separate seven grades of causal thinking. By looking at variations in force dynamics as a
central element in causal cognition, we analyze the thinking required for different hunting
technologies such as stabbing spears, throwing spears, launching atlatl darts, shooting
arrows with a bow, and the use of poisoned arrows. Our interpretation demonstrates
that there is an interplay between the extension of human body through technology
and expanding our cognitive abilities to reason about causes. It adds content and
dimension to the trend of including embodied cognition in evolutionary studies and in
the interpretation of the archeological record. Our method could explain variation in
technology sets between archaic and modern human groups.
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INTRODUCTION
We argue that an increased capacity to reason about causes enabled a development in tool
technology along the hominin line. The main cognitive development behind the more advanced
form of causal cognition is the unique hominin ability to mentally represent force dynamics.
We illustrate the expansion of reasoning about forces by a study of different kinds of hunting
technologies (stabbing spears, throwing spears, launching atlatl darts, shooting arrows with a bow,
and the use of poisoned arrows) and what types of casual reasoning they involve.
Hominin hunting technologies represent a class of material culture that is often centered on
‘force.’ Some hunting technologies can be traced through time (e.g., Lombard, 2011; Sisk and Shea,
2011; Yaroshevich et al., 2016), providing a window on the evolution of applied force dynamics.
Tools used during non-human primate hunting provide insight into their material engagement
during some hunting activities (e.g., Preutz and Bertolani, 2007). Malafouris (2013, p. 7) stresses
that “understanding the relationship between cognition and material culture what it is, how it
changes, and what role the human body plays in forging those links is of the utmost importance for
the study of mind.” Today, humans are the only group who has been, or can be defined as, a species
based on our relationship with technology (e.g., Ambrose, 2001; Boivin, 2008; Barham, 2013;
Lombard, 2016), so that tracing the development of such a relationship may throw valuable light on
how we became who/what we are. We extend our bodies, and by implication our minds, through
the ‘prosthetic’ use of technology, and such extension can go beyond physical reach (Malafouris,
2013), exerting ‘remote control’ over our socio-economic environments.
In the recent ‘third hand’ debate Bruner and Lozano (2014) also argue that without technology
it would be impossible for the human mind to do what is does or to be what it is. They draw
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on ‘extended mind’ theory in which our cognition and
neural circuits are profoundly rooted in and shaped by object
engagement. Neurologically, objects are interpreted differently
when they are within body range (i.e., if they can interact
physically with the body, occupying a peri-personal area
instead), as opposed to being without reach (extra-personal space
materiality) (e.g., Berti and Frassinetti, 2000; Maravita et al.,
2003; Maravita and Iriki, 2004; Davoli et al., 2012). In short,
based on attributes of Neanderthal teeth, it was argued that
Homo neanderthalensis and probably H. heidelbergensis used
their mouths as a third hand “because of an incomplete brain-
environment body interface and limits in visuospatial integration
ability” (Bruner and Lozano, 2014, p. 278). This suggests
that the Neanderthals had a limited ability to conceptualize
and use technologies that function across distance and time.
Bruner and Lozano (2014) aimed to provide an alternative
interpretation as opposed to the bio-cultural information gained
from paleontology and archeology, but acknowledged that their
conclusion is difficult to test. We suggest that by looking at
force dynamics through the lens of causal cognition and hunting
technologies, it is possible to further enrich our repertoire for
thinking about variability in hominin cognitive evolution.
SEVEN GRADES OF CAUSAL
COGNITION
Our first task is to delineate the notion of causal cognition. Unlike
many philosophers who view causation as an aspect of the world,
we aim for a psychological account of how humans, including our
ancestors, and non-human animals thought/think about causes.
We do not suppose that there is only one form of causal thinking.
In this respect we agree with Woodward (2011), who identified
three kinds of learning about causal relations [see also Gärdenfors
(2003), section 2.8, for a related account]. He calls the first kind
‘egocentric learning’ and defines it as the ability to learn that
one’s own physical actions can cause certain outcomes. This
form of learning is based on ordinary operant or instrumental
conditioning and allows an individual to perceive itself as an
agent, that is, to be aware that by controlling one’s body one can
control certain aspects of the environment and one’s relation to it.
Woodward’s second kind is ‘agent causal learning,’ where an
individual also learns about causes from the actions of others.
This form of causal thinking involves understanding that the
outcomes of the actions of others have implications for what
would result from an individual’s own actions. For example,
a young chimpanzee that observes her mother cracking a nut
by using a hammer stone can grasp that she too should be
able to achieve a similar result by following similar actions.
Being able to learn causal relations from the actions of others
makes it possible for the individual to imitate/emulate behaviors
(Tomasello, 1999). It sometimes also involves certain forms of
mindreading, that is, understanding what goal and desires the
other individual have.
The third kind Woodward calls ‘observation/action causal
learning.’ This involves being able to integrate a range of
natural signs or patterns with the egocentric and agent causal
reasoning. We argue in section “The Role of Force Dynamics
in Causal Cognition” that this form of learning requires mental
representations of the different kinds of forces underlying the
causal interactions. Woodward (2011, p. 38, 39) notes that
the available empirical evidence suggests that apes are not
observation/action causal learners (also see Tomasello and Call,
1997).
Even though Woodward does not write about the kinds of
causal learning in evolutionary terms, it can be argued that since
many animal species are egocentric causal learners, but not agent
causal learners, his three kinds represent a form of cognitive
development. Our use of the term grade implies that the different
kinds of causal understanding we describe probably phased into
each other throughout our evolution, but does not imply that
we subscribe to a scala naturae with human cognition as the
pinnacle (see Lombard and Gärdenfors, 2017). Nevertheless,
Woodward’s three types and our expansion into seven grades
involve increasing forms of understanding of actions, forces and
the minds of others. We believe this motivates our choice of
terminology.
Building from Woodward (2011), Lombard and Gärdenfors
(2017) propose a finer gradation of the emergence of causal
cognition in humans. We briefly present the seven grades of
that model (for detailed discussion see Lombard and Gärdenfors,
2017):
Grade 1: Individual Causal
Understanding
The first grade involves a direct connection between a motor
action that an individual executes and the resulting effect. Typical
examples are a baby kicking its foot, learning the connection
between motor commands and the resulting actions, or a kitten
playing with a toy. In this case both the cause and the effect are
directly perceived. The result is that the individual experiences
its own agency. This grade need not involve strong cognitive
mechanisms, but can be explained via learning by conditioning.
The first grade corresponds to Woodward’s (2011) egocentric
causal learner. The following grades 2–5 represent a partitioning
of his agent causal learners.
Grade 2: Cued Dyadic-Causal
Understanding
This grade involves two individuals who take turns in performing
a similar action. One example is two puppies rough-and-tumble
playing, taking turns in attacking (Bekoff and Byers, 1998). The
motor forces behind the other individual’s actions are not directly
perceived, but they are inferred via a mapping onto the forces
involved in one’s own actions. Thus, I understand that the action
of the other causes an effect because it gives the same result as my
own action. On this grade, one individual understands the agency
of the other.
Grade 3: Conspecific Mindreading
Humans understand how our desires, intentions and beliefs lead
to different kinds of actions. One example of detached dual-
causal understanding is gaze following, i.e., understanding that
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if someone is looking firmly in a particular direction, there is
something worthy of attention in that direction. In other words,
the onlooker infers that there is a cause for the gaze direction,
even if the onlooker itself cannot perceive the cause, but uses his
or her understanding of the inner state of the one looking as a
cause of the behavior. On this grade, attention, desires, intentions
and beliefs are seen as ‘mental forces’ causing the action (see
Gärdenfors, 2003, 2007).
Grade 4: Detached Dyadic-Causal
Understanding
Sometimes we do not perceive the actions of somebody else, but
only the traces of them. An example is the tracks of a person
in the snow leading up to your house. The cause is detached
from the present situation (Gärdenfors, 1995). I don’t see the
person, but conclude that somebody’s presence in the past is the
cause of the tracks. I infer the agency of somebody else, which
leads to the presence of the tracks. This grade depends on the
capacity to entertain two mental representations at the same
time, that is, the current perceptual state of seeing the tracks
together with my imagination of the person being present in the
field.
Several experiments and observations indicate that monkeys
and apes often do not infer physical causes from their effects
(e.g., Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; Povinelli, 2000, but see Mulcahy
and Call, 2006), hence they do not reach this grade. Being able
to reason from effects to non-present causes seems to be unique
to humans. In line with this, Tomasello and Call (1997) suggest
that apes are not observation/action causal learners in the sense
of Woodward (2011).
Grade 5: Causal Understanding and
Mindreading of Non-conspecifics
We sometimes have a dyadic-causal understanding of the actions
and intentions of other species, although their motor actions
and cognitive processes are different from ours. The most
interesting case in relation to hunting is human detached causal
understanding of non-human animals. For example, when I see
an animal track, I can sometimes infer the cause, since I recognize
the track as that of a gemsbok. With increased experience, I may
also be able to infer the mental states of the animal, for example,
if I see blood in the tracks and that the gemsbok is limping, I
can, first, draw the conclusion that the gemsbok is hurt by using
detached dyadic-causal reasoning, and, second, that it is in pain
by using a form of empathy mirroring my own experiences of
being hurt. The difference, between grades 3 and 4 on the one
hand, and grade 5 on the other, is gradual and depends to a large
extent on the experience of the behavior of other species. The
actions and mental states of other animals map less directly onto
our own, since their bodies and their inner worlds are different,
but we can learn the mapping.
Our main reason for making the distinctions between
grades 2–5 is that they involve increasing use of detached
representations and of mindreading. We argue later that the
detached representations are necessary for the historically later
forms of hunting technologies.
Our two last grades involve a partitioning of Woodward’s
(2011) observation/action causal learner.
Grade 6: Inanimate Causal
Understanding
We reach a more advanced grade of causal understanding when
we can ascribe causal roles to inanimate objects. I see a twig being
stuck in the resin on the trunk of a tree or I see an animal being
stuck in the mud of the drying waterhole. Again I don’t perceive
the cause, but I infer the forces from the resin or the mud. Such
understanding would enable me, to make a direct correlation
between the use of resin or tree gum as an adhesive, and enable
me to construct a composite tool such as a stone-tipped spear
for hunting. Unlike the previous cases, there is no animate agent
that performs an action. For this grade we argue in the following
section that causation is understood in terms of force dynamics
(Povinelli, 2000; Wolff, 2007; Gärdenfors and Warglien, 2012) as
an extension of agency.
Grade 7: Causal Network Understanding
We suggest that the most complex grade of causal cognition is the
understanding of how domain-specific causal node sets connect
or link to inter-domain causal networks (e.g., Tenenbaum and
Niyogi, 2003). The most advanced form of this kind of reasoning
is science (i.e., hypothetical reasoning) (e.g., Gopnik et al., 1999).
Thus, with causal network understanding I am able to abstract
the knowledge gained from one domain and apply it to another
by imagining how past scenarios can be used in the future to
solve a range of unrelated problems innovatively. For example, if
by understanding the interplay between forces and counterforces
I have learned how to fasten a stone tip to a spear (grade
6 causal understanding), now equipped with grade 7 causal
understanding, I also understand that the abstract principle of
fastening one object to another can be used in an endless array
of disconnected contexts. Such understanding could help me
to engineer a snare for catching prey or to combine several
different materials to construct a shelter or vessel to cross bodies
of water, etc. (for further discussion and examples see Lombard
and Gärdenfors, 2017).
During this grade of causal understanding, aspects of all the
previous causal understanding grades can be integrated and
mapped onto each other into increasing complexity.
Further to Our Model
The theoretical framework of our 7-grade model for the evolution
of causal cognition is based on the levels of detachment from
egocentric learning or individual understanding. Compared to
Woodward’s (2011) classification, we provide a more nuanced
understanding of the evolution of causal cognition, which is
testable against empirical data from the palaeoanthropological
and archeological records (e.g., Lombard and Gärdenfors, 2017).
In particular, by splitting Woodward’s agent causal learners
into grades 2–5, we have previously concluded that non-human
animals manage grade 2, do it less well than humans on grade
3 and are very limited when it comes to grade 4 (Lombard
and Gärdenfors, 2017). It is key, however, to appreciate that
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even though the simpler grades of causal understanding support
or scaffold the more complex ones, our framework does not
automatically denote a unilinear evolutionary trajectory (e.g.,
Haidle et al., 2015; Lombard, 2016). Within each grade of causal
understanding there might be several levels of complexity that
developed at different times in different places and/or in different
hominin populations (Lombard and Gärdenfors, 2017).
THE ROLE OF FORCE DYNAMICS IN
CAUSAL COGNITION
Our main hypothesis concerning the difference between human
causal cognition and that of other animals is that non-
human animals understand causation only in terms of agency
(Woodward’s first two kinds, our grades 1–5), while humans
can reason about causes also via forces that operate across space
(action at a distance) and through time [decoupling in the sense
of Hockett (1960) or detachment in the sense of Gärdenfors
(1995, 2003)]. In the following section we want to connect
such reasoning about forces with different forms of hunting
technologies. Before we do this we need to present the role of
forces in causal thinking in greater detail.
Monkeys are surprisingly restricted in their reasoning about
physical causes of phenomena, as has been shown by Povinelli
(2000) and others. In contrast, even small human children show
strong signs of interpreting the world with the aid of hidden
forces and other causal variables. Gopnik (1998, p. 104) claims
that “other animals primarily understand causality in terms of
the effects of their own actions on the world. In contrast, human
beings combine that understanding with a view that equates
the causal power of their own actions and those of objects
independent of them.” Going from being an agent causal learner
to being an observation/action causal learner involves a shift
in focus from actions to the underlying forces (Gärdenfors and
Warglien, 2012; Gärdenfors, 2014). The transition is difficult as
is witnessed by children’s tendency to animistic reasoning. This
tendency indicates that inanimate causal understanding takes
time to achieve in human development.
Woodward (2011, p. 28) argues that ‘force transmission’ is
not sufficient to explain causal reasoning. In the psychological
literature, force transmission has typically been interpreted
as transmission via physical contact (e.g., Leslie, 1995). It is
important to note that our use of force dynamics is much
broader. Human perception of physical forces is presumably
primary, but in interaction between humans it has been extended
to include emotional and social forces in situations involving
threats, promises, persuasions, seduction, etc. Furthermore, early
on in history, humans have learned to utilize the ‘forces’ that
are stored in various objects: medicine or poison in plants, heat
in firewood, etc. (e.g., Wadley, 2013). Within grade 6 of causal
reasoning, one can speculate about a development from direct
force transmission, to transmission at a distance in space and then
to stored physical forces (transmission at a distance in time), as in
spring traps and bows, and finally to non-physical ’forces.’
In Lombard and Gärdenfors (2017) we applied the seven-
grade model to the evolution of tracking as an example. In this
article we analyze the causal cognition involved in early forms of
tool use, in particular tools for hunting. We focus on inanimate
causation, that is, grades 6 and 7, since it is the understanding of
the causal effects of the hunting tools that will be relevant.
FORCE DYNAMICS IN HUNTING
TECHNOLOGIES
Our thesis is that an expanding understanding of physical force
dynamics is necessary for the construction and use of increasingly
sophisticated hunting tools. It may even be that the fitness
advantages of the emerging technologies have functioned as a
selective pressure for increasing causal reasoning concerning
physical forces (see also Wolpert, 2003; Malafouris, 2013).
Tools as Force Extensions
From an evolutionary point of view an interesting question is
what have been the selective mechanisms behind the human
capacity for inanimate causal reasoning. As mentioned in the
previous section, tool use or technology may have played an
important role. Tools extend your peri-personal space – they
allow you to act at a distance and to alter the force patterns
generated by your body. When you hit a nut with a stone you
magnify the forces acting on the nut compared to pounding on
the nut with your hand and when you poke with a stick into a
hole you extend the poking abilities of your fingers. Such tool
use represents basic causal understanding that can be roughly
associated with grades 1 and 2. With this as a background for
the development of hunting technologies, we now turn to an
analysis of the different forms of causal reasoning involved in the
technologies.
Directly Acting Forces
Some hunting weapons are based on thrusting, which represents
an understanding of direct force transmission. For example, a
thrusting spear never leaves the hand of the hunter, it simply
functions as an extension of the arm modifying the forces exerted.
Weapon engagement with the target is immediate, thus there is
only a short physical distance between hunter and prey. There is
no time dimension (delayed contact) involved.
We see that when chimpanzees hunt bush babies with
sharpened sticks, they thrust at their prey (e.g., Preutz and
Bertolani, 2007), they do not hunt by throwing. Although they
throw objects occasionally, currently only humans habitually
‘throw projectiles with high speed and great accuracy’ at targets
at a distance (Roach et al., 2013). Thrusting does not need
the powerful thumb-tip to finger-tip prehension associated with
humans (e.g., Young, 2003, 2009; Roach et al., 2012), nor a
specialized ‘throwing’ shoulder (e.g., Shaw and Stock, 2009;
Roach et al., 2013; Larson, 2015). In both cases, the physical traits
associated with ‘pinching’ and ‘throwing’ evolved subsequent to
‘grasping’ and ‘thrusting’ in the hominin record. We therefore
argue that the cognitive traits for thrusting also evolved earlier
than for habitual, accurate and forceful throwing. Because force
transmission from arm to spear to target is direct, and the
thrusting effect is felt directly in the arm, there is a strong
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mapping between cause and effect so that thrusting does not
require any of the advanced forms of causal understanding.
When sharp stone flakes or points are hafted to wooden shafts
(an element of grade 6 causal understanding), the force dynamics
of spears are changed. With such composite weaponry a cutting
or slicing force is added to that of thrusting enhancing a hunter’s
ability to harm prey effectively. Understanding to make stone-
tipped weaponry would thus have adaptive value, and from the
archeological record it is clear that Homo heidelbergensis, the
Neanderthals and H. sapiens hunted with stone-tipped spears
(Lombard, 2005; Villa and Soriano, 2010; Wilkins et al., 2012;
Haidle et al., 2015).
Technologically and cognitively, simple wooden spears are
generally thought to precede stone-tipped ones (e.g., Haidle,
2010; Lombard and Haidle, 2012; Haidle et al., 2015). It is
generally accepted that stone-tipped spears were habitually used
for hunting from about 300 thousand years ago (McBrearty and
Tryon, 2006; Lombard, 2012). Direct evidence for the use of
wooden spears date to about 400 thousand years ago (Dennell,
1997).
Forces Acting at a Distance
Even further extensions of your peri-personal space are achieved
when the tool leaves the direct control of your body and
exerts its force at a distance; i.e., becomes extra-personal space.
Throwing an object like a stone or a stick may be the first
method of force transmission at a distance (see Calvin, 1993 for a
speculative account). Chimpanzees and other apes and monkeys
throw branches and rocks, mainly as a way of intimidating
predators or rivaling conspecifics. Their ability to aim is limited
(e.g., Westergaard and Suomi, 1993; Westergaard et al., 2000;
Roach and Lieberman, 2014). During the evolution of the
hominins, not only the shape of the hand but also the shoulder
and humerus changed in such a way that made throwing much
more effective both in terms of strength and in terms of aiming
accuracy (Roach et al., 2013). Throwing spears represent the
indirect transmission of arm force. The thrusting effect of the
spear is detached in space from the thrower. This entails that
the mapping between cause and effect must be inferred from
the behavior of the animal that is hit. In learning such mapping,
some representation of force transmission and therefore a causal
reasoning of grade 6 is required.
It is reasonable to argue that, as an extension of the initial
intimidation posturing, the ability to throw with force and
accurately hit a target became selectively advantageous for
hominins who had to defend themselves, their offspring and food
sources from dangerous predators and scavengers on the African
landscape (e.g., Lombard, 2015). Acting at a distance also brings
greater safety for the thrower, whether in hunting or defense,
since it reduces risk of injury from contact with the prey or the
enemy (e.g., Villa and Soriano, 2010).
The anatomical adaptations that enable elastic energy storage
and release at the shoulder first appear in their ‘modern’
configuration in H. erectus 2 million years ago (e.g., Roach et al.,
2013). We do not necessarily see this as evidence of hunting
(there is no unambiguous evidence for hunting at this time), but
more parsimoniously as part of high-level scavenging behavior.
For example, it would have been of great advantage to be able to
throw objects and hit competing scavengers to gain safe access to
carcasses. This would imply, however, that the roots of inanimate
causal understanding (grade 6) are relatively old, and that by the
time we see the earliest evidence for spear hunting, it was present
at least in rudimentary form to be further developed. This is
in line with previous interpretations by cognitive archeologists
who argue that H. heidelbergensis (the ancestor to both the
Neanderthals and H. sapiens) were proficient spear hunters (e.g.,
Thieme, 2007; Lombard and Haidle, 2012; Conard et al., 2015).
A high level of inanimate causal understanding is probably
represented by atlatl (spear-thrower and dart technologies),
where the atlatl becomes a further force extension that increases
arm leverage and the distance between hunter and prey (e.g.,
Palter, 1977; Butler, 1975; Villa and Soriano, 2010). Brooks et al.
(2006) have argued that atlatls could have been used in southern
Africa by about 100 thousand years ago. We therefore suggest
that the ability to throw objects with force and accuracy, using
increasingly complex technologies to do so, represent phases in
the cognitive evolution of grade 6 causal understanding.
Stored Forces
Technologies involving bow and arrow or snares (that use bent
branches that are released when the snare is touched) involve
causal reasoning concerning indirect transmission of force via
stored energy. This is in contrast with using basic leverage for
spear throwing and increased leverage obtained through the use
of technologies such as the atlatl. Bow hunting probably have
been in use from as early as about 70–64 thousand years ago
in Africa (Backwell et al., 2008; Lombard and Phillipson, 2010;
Brown et al., 2012). Although the atlatl represents grade 6 of
causal cognition as well as a mechanically aided delivery system
(e.g., Lombard and Haidle, 2012), it does not represent causal
network understanding, that is grade 7. As Butler (1975, p. 105)
explained: “The increased distance a dart can be thrown with
the atlatl is a function of the increased mechanical advantage
which the atlatl provides by increasing the length of the moment
arm.” Atlatls therefore represent an amplification of endosomatic
energy to apply force.
The mechanical principles of bow hunting on the other hand,
requires both the understanding of directional force transmission
through launching a small, sharply tipped weapon (the arrow), as
well as the understanding that the stored energy in a bent branch,
similar to that of some ethno-historically used spring traps [also
see Wadley (2010) for archeological evidence], can be used to
propel such a projectile forward (Lombard and Phillipson, 2010).
The use of such exosomatic energy storage (i.e., energy generated
and stored outside of the human body), and the subsequent fast
release of elastic energy is the distinctive engineering principle of
bow-and-arrow weaponry (Carignani, 2016).
Bow hunting is a clear example of how at least two domain-
specific causal node sets (i.e., the engineering principle of
leverage and the principle of exosomatic energy-storage) are
being brought together to form a single inter-domain causal
network (a hunting machine). We therefore argue that the causal
understanding involved in bow hunting indicates minds that
are able to apply abstract engineering concepts across different
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knowledge domains. Thus, evidence for the use of such a
technology in the deep past reflects the basic principles of causal
network understanding of grade 7. We suggest, however, that
within each grade of causal understanding there is variation in
levels of complexity.
Forces Acting Over Time
A more complex form of causal network reasoning about a
‘force’ that operates at an extended period of time and maybe
across a long distance, and often out of the sight of the hunter,
is the use of poisoned arrows where animals are wounded,
but often tracked for many hours or even days before finally
killed and harvested (see Bradfield et al., 2015). Poison is
not a physical force, rather it functions chemically, adding
yet another domain-specific node set to that of bow hunting.
When preparing and using a poisoned arrow, the hunter must
rely on more advanced forms of reasoning and planning than
for the other technologies discussed here. Thus the use of
poisoned arrows is clearly an example of advanced grade 7 causal
thinking.
Ethno-historically recorded use of arrow poisons amongst the
Kalahari San indicate that large game such as wildebeest, kudu,
oryx, or eland can take up to 12–15 h before they succumb,
and often the weakened animals are killed with spears several
days after having been shot with poisoned arrows (Silberbauer,
1965). After the animal is hit with an arrow the hunter/s
track them over long distances applying speculative tracking
as described by Liebenberg (1990, 2013). Previously we have
argued that such tracking demonstrates how humans create
meaningful causal network hypotheses, i.e., an advanced form of
grade 7 causal reasoning [see Lombard and Gärdenfors (2017)
for discussion]. This was based on combining different forms
of knowledge, including intimate knowledge of kin, non-kin
and animal behavior and their inanimate signs, together with
knowledge about the landscape (its geographic features, water
sources, vegetation, etc.), abstract causal understanding and the
mental maps, thought processes and social contexts of the tracker.
Adding poison [often consisting of several ingredients and
heat treated (see Bradfield et al., 2015)] to the mix of a bow
hunter’s arsenal, implies an understanding that a killing or
weakening force can be physically and visibly applied through
the poisoned arrow tip, but that the force then works ‘on its
own’ and over time to provide the desired effect. The abstraction
of understanding that a ‘soft,’ seemingly unforceful chemical
substance might deliver lethal force working over an extended
period in the absence of the hunters requires advanced causal
reasoning. Today’s Kalahari bow hunters, similar to their past
counterparts, “may not have a formal understanding of chemistry
or chemical reactions, but they have an indigenous knowledge
system that enables them to use plant and animal extracts
effectively for medicines or poisons” (Bradfield et al., 2015, p. 39).
Wadley (2010) has argued that out-of-sight, long-distance
action involving response inhibition, such as setting snares, seems
to be a convincing proxy for complex cognition. In line with our
argument, Bradfield et al. (2015, p. 39), however, suggested that
“the combinations of active and passive meat-getting strategies,
and the presence of visible and invisible stages of the hunt, make
the use of poisoned arrows a more complex behavior than either
snaring or bow hunting alone.” Here we suggest that bow hunting
with poisoned arrows represents a deep network of reasoning
similar in complexity to the modern human mind of today.
Currently, it is thought that poisoned bone-tipped arrows could
have been used from about 43,000 years ago in Southern Africa
(e.g., d’Errico et al., 2012; Robbins et al., 2012). Whereas earlier
evidence might yet be revealed, we suggest that this age can now
be seen as the probable minimum for enhanced or complex levels
of grade 7 causal understanding.
The upshot from this study is that we find a strong correlation
between age of technology and complexity of causal reasoning.
We probably see a gradual development in, and between and
within, both grades 6 and 7 causal understanding over the
last 500 thousand years of our evolution. If we accept current
archeological evidence then the chronology can be reconstructed
as follows:
• Hunting with spears from about 500–400 thousand
years ago associated with H. heidelbergensis and
H. neanderthalensis (Dennell, 1997; Wilkins et al.,
2012).
• Hunting with throwing spears from about 300 thousand
years ago associated with H. sapiens and H. neanderthalensis
(Thieme, 1997; Villa and Soriano, 2010, but see Churchill,
1993; Schmitt et al., 2003).
• Hunting with spear-throwers/atlatls and darts from about
100 thousand years ago associated with H. sapiens and
perhaps H. neanderthalensis (Brooks et al., 2006; Shea,
2006).
• Hunting with bows and arrows from about 65 thousand
years ago, and thus far exclusive to H. sapiens (Backwell
et al., 2008; Lombard and Phillipson, 2010).
• Hunting with poisoned arrows at least from about 43 and 24
thousand years ago exclusive to H. sapiens (d’Errico et al.,
2012; Robbins et al., 2012).
DISCUSSION
Here we have argued that hominins became efficient tool users
and tool inventors because their reasoning about causes was
extended across causal networks and into the physical domain,
and that they became increasingly skilled at understanding
causation at a distance in space and through time. Advanced
levels of grade 7 causal network understanding, represented
here by hunting machines and chemical substances operating
over long distances or remotely, are similar to concepts of
fluid intelligence (e.g., Carroll, 1993) and analogical reasoning
(Green et al., 2010). It also reminds of Mithen’s (1994, 1996)
notion that only when his four ‘domains of intuitive intelligence’
(i.e., linguistic, social, technical, and natural history) are fully
integrated, we are able to generalize abstract knowledge from
one domain to others into the creative, innovative and flexible
solutions characteristic of modern humans. He saw evidence
for such advanced levels in cognitive fluidity from about 60
thousand years ago in the archeological record (see Haidle, 2010
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for further discussion), at roughly the same time we start seeing
archeological evidence for bow hunting in Africa (Lombard,
2016).
We have used hunting weaponry as an example to illustrate
the interplay between more advanced causal thinking concerning
force dynamics and technological development. The weaponry
successively allowed action over increasing space and time, and
ultimately also exploited stored energy and chemical compounds
to extend the range of applied forces. If our model for the
evolution of causal understanding is robust, there should be
cognitive and neuroscientific correlates to support it. It is beyond
the scope of this contribution to provide an exhaustive review
on such literature, but below we highlight some research to this
effect.
A cognitive archeological study demonstrated that, compared
to spear hunting, conceptual, technological, and behavioral
modularization and flexibility is amplified during bow hunting
(Lombard and Haidle, 2012; also see e.g., Carignani, 2016). This
enables an almost endless variety of element combinations in
operational chains to reach single or multiple goals, offering the
instantaneous and spontaneous capability to effectively handle
any one possibility or situation out of a suite of diverse (foreseen
and unforeseen) scenarios (Lombard and Haidle, 2012). It allows
for a range of cognitive and cultural complexity and flexibility,
basic to human behavior today, applied in the most complex of
technologies (Lombard, 2016). This is consistent with our grade 7
causal network understanding, and with the archeological record
where spear hunting (whether thrust or thrown) precedes bow
hunting by hundreds of thousands of years.
In the only neuro-archeological experiment thus far
conducted on spear throwing vs. arrow shooting, results
indicated that some elements of the central executive were
probably in place for Stone Age spear hunters (Williams
et al., 2014). This interpretation suggests that spear-hunting
Neanderthals and H. heidelbergensis possessed some forms of
executive functioning, and we therefore argue that they have
evolved at least some (in the case of H. heidelbergensis), if not
all (in the case of Neanderthals) of the capacity for grade 6
causal reasoning. Shooting arrows with a bow, on the other
hand, showed statistically significant higher levels of neural
activity compared with spear-throwing. Arrow-shooting seems
to require increased visual acuity, context updating, internal
attention, mental rehearsal, sustained attention and memory
load (Williams et al., 2014). Today, these are seen as uniquely
human traits, enabling us to synchronize ideas or concepts with
motor planning and task execution (Ayres, 1985; May-Benson
and Cermak, 2007), which is consistent with our grade 7 causal
understanding.
A synthesis of neuro-scientific work on the cognitive
processes that give rise to human causal (relational) reasoning
indicates that prefrontal areas show domain independence
during high-level causal reasoning, while areas within the
temporal, parietal, and occipital lobes exhibit evidence of domain
dependence in reasoning (e.g., Krawczyk, 2012). Additionally,
neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies, indicate that
human behaviors associated with complex tool use is facilitated
by functionally specialized networks involving temporal, parietal
and frontal areas (Johnson-Frey, 2004). Goldenberg and Spatt
(2009) found that parietal lesions impaired mechanical problem
solving (i.e., understanding how one tool interacts with other
tools, which is essential for conceptualizing and using a ‘machine’
such as a bow and arrow). In sum, a shared and integrated fronto-
parietal network is key in human spatial attention, space-related
behaviors and fluid reasoning/intelligence (e.g., Doricchi et al.,
2008; Hampshire et al., 2011; Barbey et al., 2012).
Whereas archaic and modern human frontal skull bones are
known to be externally distinct, CT scans of mid-Pleistocene,
Neanderthal and modern human crania revealed that the
internal prefrontal structure showed no significant alteration
over a period of about 500 thousand years of human evolution
(Bookstein et al., 1999). This is consistent with the neuro-
archeological work that found evidence for some elements of
the central executive in spear hunting (Williams et al., 2014),
an activity strongly associated with Neanderthals, and our
interpretation that they had grade 6 causal understanding.
Bruner’s (2010) palaeo-neurological analysis, however, shows
that of all hominins only H. sapiens displays a general
enlargement of the complete parietal surface, and that the
variation in morphological details of that region suggests neuro-
functional differences in visuospatial integration such as the
“recognition and codification of the outer spatial environment
and the associated integration between the outer frame and
the inner perceptions” (Bruner, 2010, p. S77). We argue that
effective fronto-parietal integration, as is observed in normal
modern humans today, is only possible after this evolutionary
development. It is also a critical development for the human
ability to hypothesize about technological solutions for problems
functioning with extended space-time dimensions, such as
hunting with a snare or a poisoned arrow.
With bow hunting, reasoning and problem solving depend
on the ability to represent and integrate complex relationships
(e.g., Kroger et al., 2002). Causal/relational complexity increases
with the number of interdependent elements across space and
through time that must be simultaneously considered to solve
a problem. Hunting remotely in the ‘mind’s eye’ with poison
or snares represents high-level grade 7 causal understanding
(relational reasoning) with a delayed spatiotemporal aspect and
a highly developed ability to visualize, imagine or pre-empt an
outcome. The ability to imagine a range of potential outcomes,
to understand the consequences of those outcomes, and to grasp
that the outcomes may have been different if any of the preceding
circumstances varied (i.e., counterfactual thinking, as in Baird
and Fugelsang, 2004) is key to current modern human reasoning.
It seems that the neural hardware for effective counterfactual
reasoning only reach its final development relatively late in
humans – after adolescence (Baird and Fugelsang, 2004).
Functional brain imaging on healthy 8–19 year olds also suggests
that neuro-maturational changes associated with visuo-spatial
relational reasoning shift from a widespread frontal pattern
in childhood to predominant parieto-frontal activation in late
adolescence (Eslinger et al., 2009). Together with the relative
late enlargement of the complete parietal surface in hominin
evolution (Bruner, 2010), these observations may explain why
bow hunting is unique to H. sapiens, and why space-time-delayed
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hunting with poisoned arrows appear so late in our technological
repertoire.
CONCLUSION
The main contribution of this article is to place emphasis on
the role of force dynamics to understand the evolution of causal
cognition. This supports Malafouris’ (2013) position that there
is a back-and-forth interaction between the extension of human
body through technology and the extension of our cognitive
abilities. It is also in line with Bruner and Lozanos’ (2014)
argument that the development of the human mind cannot be
decoupled from the use of technology. Ultimately, if scenarios
about our cognitive evolution are to be robust, it is important that
multiple lines of evidence come together to mutually strengthen
and/or constrain our interpretations.
We see a chronological progression, starting from thrusting
spears, through bow hunting with poisoned arrows that maps
onto our progression of causal thinking, and potentially onto
the evolution of the Neanderthals and H. sapiens from the
more archaic H. heidelbergensis. Our examples of weaponry are
not exhaustive. We chose them to illustrate the connections
of technologies to different grades of causal reasoning and to
highlight potential developments within grades. Our analytic
tools not limited to hunting technologies, but could be extended
to other technologies such as thread-based material culture from
early twine production to complex knotting (e.g., knitting) and
weaving with machines.
The theory of causal grades can explain why spear hunting is
older than bow hunting since the causal reasoning required for
using spears is less advanced than that for using bows. We suggest
that clear examples of grade 7 causal thinking are only found
relatively late. Currently, it seems that from about 70 thousand
years ago, technologies such as bow hunting and using spring
traps rely on using and understanding exosomatically stored
energy. Thus far it seems that such technologies are unique to
H. sapiens and may reflect variation in causal understanding
between modern and archaic groups. Poisoned arrows could
have been used from about 43 thousand years ago (Robbins
et al., 2012), and arrow poison itself preserved on a wooden
applicator dated to 29 thousand years ago (d’Errico et al., 2012).
Currently, these finds represent the earliest evidence for hunting
behavior that requires enhanced grades of causal cognition,
spanning several knowledge domains. This interpretation implies
continued intra-species cognitive evolution for humans in line
with what was suggested by, for example Malafouris (2010) and
Kolb and Gibb (2011).
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